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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attack
which is maliciously implemented by adding human-imperceptible
perturbation to images and thus leads to incorrect prediction. Ex-
isting studies have proposed various methods to detect the new
adversarial attacks. However, new attack methods keep evolving
constantly and yield new adversarial examples to bypass the ex-
isting detectors. It needs to collect tens of thousands samples to
train detectors, while the new attacks evolve much more frequently
than the high-cost data collection. Thus, this situation leads the
newly evolved attack samples to remain in small scales. To solve
such few-shot problem with the evolving attacks, we propose a
meta-learning based robust detection method to detect new ad-
versarial attacks with limited examples. Specifically, the learning
consists of a double-network framework: a task-dedicated network
and a master network which alternatively learn the detection ca-
pability for either seen attack or a new attack. To validate the
effectiveness of our approach, we construct the benchmarks with
few-shot-fashion protocols based on three conventional datasets,
i.e. CIFAR-10, MNIST and Fashion-MNIST. Comprehensive exper-
iments are conducted on them to verify the superiority of our
approach with respect to the traditional adversarial attack de-
tection methods. The implementation code is available online at
https://github.com/sharpstill/MetaAdvDet.
CCS CONCEPTS
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1 INTRODUCTION
The evolving adversarial attacks threaten the deep convolutional
neural networks (DNNs) via adding human-imperceptible perturba-
tion to clean images and thus lead to incorrect prediction. Various
defense methods have been proposed for detecting attacks, which
distinguish adversarial images and real images via capturing the
features of DNNs under attacks [3, 28, 45, 51]. However, new at-
tack methods keep constantly evolving and yield new adversarial
examples to bypass existing detector. For example, C&W attack [4]
is proposed to circumvent all existing detection techniques at that
time. Certain detection techniques have been proposed to detect
new attacks [8, 43], these techniques are promising. However, most
of them need tens of thousands of examples to train which are
infeasible in practice. Because new attacks evolve much faster than
the high-cost data collection, which results in a few-shot learning
problem with evolving attacks. This issue makes the detection of
adversarial examples still challenging.
Therefore, we study on how to tackle such few-shot learning
problem, and propose a meta-learning based training approach
with the learning-to-learn strategy. It focuses on learning to de-
tect new attack from one or few instances of that attack. We name
our approach as MetaAdvDet, refers toMeta-learning Adversarial
Detection approach. To this end, the approach is equipped with a
double-network framework for learning from tasks, which is de-
fined as the small data collection with real examples and randomly
chosen type of attacks. The purpose of introducing the tasks is to
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Figure 1: The procedure of MetaAdvDet training in one
mini-batch (best viewed in color). The approach consists
of a double-network framework: M and T . T is the task-
dedicated network which focuses on learning each task. It
copies parameters frommaster networkM at the beginning,
and then trains on the support set. After a couple of itera-
tions (inner update step), T converges and computes the gra-
dientGi on the query set of task i.M accumulates the gradi-
ents ∑Ki=1Gi to update its parametersMθ which is prepared
for the nextmini-batch learning. The learnedM can be used
to detect new attackswith limited new samples.More details
can be found in Sec.3.2 and Algorithm 1.
simulate new attack scenarios. To better learn from tasks, MetaAd-
vDet uses one network to focus on learning individual tasks, and the
other network to learn the general detection strategy over multiple
tasks. Fig. 1 illustrates the training procedure of one mini-batch,
more details are described in Sec. 3.2. Each task is divided into
support set and query set, which are used for learning either basic
detection capability on old attacks, or minimizing the test error on
new attacks. After training, the framework efficiently detects new
attack with fine-tuning on limited examples. In contrast, the DNN
based methods that use‘ the traditional training approach perform
much worse in detecting new attacks than ours.
To comprehensively validate the detection techniques in terms of
evolving attacks, we propose evaluations in following dimensions
to validate the superiority of our approach in the few-shot problem.
Cross-adversary Dimension. To assess the capability of de-
tecting new types of attacks in test set with few-shot samples..
Cross-domain Dimension. To assess the capability of detect-
ing all attacks across different domains with few-shot samples.
Cross-architecture Dimension. To assess the capability of de-
tecting the adversarial examples that are generated by attacking
the classifier with new architecture.
White-box attack dimension. To assess the capability of de-
tecting white-box attacks with few-shot samples.
To validate the effectiveness of our approach from above dimen-
sions, we propose benchmarks with the few-shot-fashion protocol
on three conventional datasets, i.e. CIFAR-10, MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST datasets. The benchmarks include the generated adversarial
examples by using various types of attacks, and it also defines the
partition of train set and test set to simulate the scenario of testing
the evolving attack’s detection.
In experiments, we compare our approach with end-to-end state-
of-the-art methods using these benchmarks, and the results show
that our approach surpasses the existing method by a large margin.
We summarize the main contributions below:
(1) To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to define the
adversarial attack detection problem as a few-shot learning problem
of detecting evolving new attacks.
(2) We propose a meta-learning based approach: MetaAdvDet, it
is equipped with a double-network framework with the learning-
to-learn strategy for detecting evolving attacks. Benefiting from
the learning-to-learn strategy, our approach is able to achieve high
performance in detecting new attacks.
(3) To comprehensively validate our approach in terms of evolv-
ing attacks, we construct benchmarks with the few-shot-fashion
protocol on three datasets, i.e. CIFAR-10, MNIST and Fashion-
MNIST. The benchmarks define the partition of train set and test
set to simulate the scenario of testing the evolving attack. We be-
lieve the proposed benchmark is useful for the future research of
defending evolving attacks.
2 BACKGROUND
Many attempts have been made to detect or defense against adver-
sarial attack. We first introduce the defense techniques, and then
we introduce the meta-learning techniques that related to our work.
2.1 Defense Techniques
The adversary algorithm is used to generate the adversarial exam-
ples which makes the classifier to output incorrect prediction. Many
defense techniques have been proposed to defend against adversar-
ial attack, these techniques generally fall into two categories.
The first category attempts to build a robust model that classifies
the adversarial example correctly, such as [1, 26, 38, 42]. However,
certain new attacks [7, 23] are deliberately implemented to grasp the
weakness of these methods to circumvent the defense. For example,
Athalye et al. [2] identifies the obfuscated gradients, which is a
kind of gradient masking, that leads to a false sense of security in
defenses. Based on their findings, the new attacks are proposed to
circumvent 7 of 9 defenses relying on obfuscated gradients.
Due to the difficulty, the second category of defense techniques
turn to distinguish the adversarial examples from real ones, in
order to improve security and detect malicious users. This category
refers to adversarial attack detection. Unlike the first category,
adversarial detection does not need to classify the adversarial image
correctly, but only to identify them. Essentially, a detector is also
a binary classifier which is trained on the real and adversarial
examples. Based on this idea, certain detection techniques [5, 30, 43]
build a subnet classifier to capture the hidden layer’s features of
the adversarial example. Other methods include (1) capturing the
difference of DNN’s output between real and adversarial images
when applying certain transformation to the input images [3, 8, 45,
51], (2) utilizing the intrinsic dimensionality of adversarial regions
[28], (3) employing new loss function to encourage DNN to learn
a more distinguishable representation [34, 48], (4) using statistical
test [15], and (5) using the capsule network [12].
However, the high-cost data collection cannot keep up with the
evolution frequency of the attacks, which leads the training for
detecting new attacks difficulty. For example, when a new attack
first appears without publishing the source code, most of defend-
ers have insufficient examples to train the detector. This situation
makes the issue of detecting evolving attacks highly urgent. We
categorize this issue as a new defense problem, which is a few-shot
learning problem of detecting evolving attacks.
2.2 Meta-Learning
Few-shot learning problem [41, 47] has been studied for a long time,
which is defined as learning from few samples. The meta-learning
techniques [10, 11, 18, 24, 31] are promising for addressing the
few-shot learning problem, which usually trains a meta-learner on
the distribution of few-shot tasks so that the it can generalize and
perform well on the unseen task. Model-agnostic meta-learning
(MAML) [11] is a typical meta-learning approach, which learns a
internal representation that is widely suitable for many tasks. It
learns a proper weight initialization on the support set and then
updates itself to perform well on the query set. To update the
weightsmore efficiently, Meta-SGD [24]makes themeta-learner not
only to learn the weight initialization but also update direction and
learning rate. For better understanding in this field, we introduce
the terminologies of meta-learning, as describe below.
Task: A meta-learning model (meta-learner) should be trained
over a variety of tasks and optimized for the best performance
on the task distribution, including potentially unseen tasks. The
concept of “task” in this paper is totally different from the concept
of “multi-task learning”, but only a manner of data partition that
the meta-learner used to train.
Support&query set: Each task is split into two subsets, which
are the support set for learning the basic classification on old tasks,
and the query set for training in the train stage or testing in the
test stage. It should be emphasized that the support set and query
set from the same task have the same data distribution.
Way is the class in each task that the meta-learner wish to
discriminate, whose number may be specified arbitrarily and do
not need to equal the ground truth class number.
Shot is the number of samples in each way of the support set. For
example, an N -way, K-shot classification task includes the support
set with K labeled examples for each of N classes.
Based on the spirit of meta-learning, we propose the training
methodwith a double-network framework and introduce the double-
update scheme for achieving fast adaption capacity. Experiments
show the superiority of our approach in detecting new attacks.
3 APPROACH
3.1 Overview
The evolving adversarial attacks are hard to distinguish due to
the insufficient new adversarial examples for training the detector,
results in the few-shot learning problem. One of the keys for solv-
ing this problem is to use the power of meta-learning techniques.
Typical meta-learning methods (e.g. MAML [11]) are trained for
learning the task distribution. Because the categories of data in each
Real 
support
Support 2
C&W
support
FGSM attack examples
C&W attack examples
…
PGD attack examples
Real examples
Task 1
Way-1
FGSM
support
FGSM
query
Way-2
Real 
support
Real 
query
Adversarial example dataset
Task K
Way-1
PGD
support
PGD
query
Way-2
Real 
support
Real 
query
…
construct tasks
…
Task 2
Way-1
C&W
support
C&W
query
Way-2
Real 
support
Real 
query
𝜽
𝒯 ℳ
meta learner
Training stage: outer update
Testing stage: evaluation
Sample query set of a mini-batch
FGSM
query
Real 
query
Query 1
FGSM
support
Real 
support
Support 1
Real 
query
Query 2
C&W
query
Real 
query
Query K
PGD
query
Real 
support
Support K
PGD
support
Sample support set of a mini-batch
… …
Inner update
for T iterations
Figure 2: The details of constructing tasks for training
and testing the meta-learner (including T and M). Each
task (support&query set) is sampled independently from
the dataset, and each mini-batch consists of K tasks. The
training employs a double-update scheme: inner update and
outer update. The inner update represents that T learns on
support set, and the outer update representsM updateswith
the accumulated gradients of T on query set (as described in
Fig. 1 and Sec. 3.2).M can be used to detect new attacks.
task are randomly chosen, the meta-leaner acquires fast adaption
capability to unseen data type via learning these tasks. To model
the attack detection technique in the meta-learning style frame-
work, we collect various types of attacks to construct adversarial
example dataset into the multiple tasks form (Fig. 2). Each task
is a small data collection with a randomly chosen attack which
represents one attacking scenario, so the large amount of tasks
make the meta-learner experience various attacking scenarios, so
that it can adapt to new attacks rapidly. Our approach is equipped
with a double-network framework with learning-to-learn strategy,
which focuses on learning how to learn new tasks faster by reusing
previous experience, rather than considering new tasks in isolation.
Specifically, one network of our framework focuses on learning
from individual tasks (named task-dedicated network T ), the other
network updates its parameters based on the gradient accumulated
from the T (named master networkM), to learn a general strategy
over all tasks (Fig. 1). This double-network framework leads to the
double update scheme, corresponding to the two networks.
Fig. 2 shows the details of constructing tasks for training and test-
ing the meta-learner, Fig. 1 demonstrates the procedure of training
in one mini-batch, detailed steps are shown in Algorithm 1.
3.2 Learning MetaAdvDet
As we mentioned earlier, the learning-to-learn strategy is proposed
to learn new attacks by reusing previous experience of detecting
old attacks. Following the typical setting of meta-learning, all the
training data are organized into tasks, each task is divided to two
subsets, namely, the support set for learning basic capability of
detecting old attacks, and the query set acts as the surrogate of new
attacks for achieving rapid adaption in detecting new attacks of test
set. To learn the tasks, the meta-learner includes a double-network
framework, i.e. the master networkM, and a task-dedicated net-
work T which is cloned fromM to learn from individual tasks. T
updates its parameters Tθ based on each task’s support set, and
then it calculates its gradient of the query set, which will be ac-
cumulated to updateM’s parametersMθ (Fig. 1). The sameMθ
will be copied and overwritten to the Tθ before learning next task.
TheM and T output the classification probability to distinguish
the real and adversarial example, corresponding to the two-way
configuration. The two-way configuration stipulates that one of
the ways should use real examples in all tasks. Two options are
considered, i.e. the randomized-way setting, whose two-way labels
are shuffled in each task; and the fixed-way setting, which uses
label 1 for real example and label 0 for adversarial example in all
tasks. We will compare the effect of above two options in Sec. 5.4.
Algorithm 1 shows the training procedure, Fig. 1 shows the
detail of one mini-batch training procedure. T copies the all the
parameters fromM at the beginning of learning task Ti , where the
subscript i denotes the task index. Then, the inner update step up-
dates the parameters ofT by using the support set ofTi for multiple
iterations. Line 8 and line 9 demonstrate this step, which is the same
with the supervised learning in the traditional DNN: we directly
feed input images to T and uses the gradient descent to update its
parameters based on the classification ground truth. Unlike existing
methods that applying transformation on input images [45, 51], we
should note that the input image is not applied any transformation
in this step of our approach. Finally, the meta-learner acquires rapid
adaption capability by considering to minimize the test error on new
data, this is the role that the outer update step upon the query set
plays. More specifically, we calculate the cross entropy loss L on
the query set of task Ti to obtain the gradientGi w.r.t. Tθ , which is
accumulated from learning all tasks T1, . . . ,TK and finally sent to
M. BecauseM and T use the same network structure and param-
eters, the accumulated gradient can be used to update parameters
ofM, namelyMθ . Thus,∑Ki=1Gi updates theMθ for learning the
strategy over the multi-task distribution.
Algorithm 1 MetaAdvDet training procedure
Input: master networkM and its parametersMθ , task-dedicated
network T and its parameters Tθ , the feed-forward function
fTθ ofT , max iterationsN , inner-update learning rate λ1, outer-
update learning rate λ2, inner updates iteration T , the multi-
task format dataset D, cross entropy loss function L.
Output: the learned networkM
1: for iter ← 1 to N do
2: sample K tasks Ti,i ∈{1, · · ·,K } from D
3: for i ← 1 to K do
4: Si and Qi ← support set and query set of Ti
5: Tθ ←Mθ ▷ copy parameters fromM to T
6: Tθ ′ ← Tθ ▷ Tθ will be used in the outer update
7: for t ← 1 to T do
8: Calculate ∇Tθ ′L(fTθ ′ ) by using Si
9: Tθ ′ ← Tθ ′ − λ1∇Tθ ′L(fTθ ′ ) ▷ inner update
10: end for
11: Gi ← ∇Tθ L(fTθ ′ ) by using Qi
12: end for
13: Mθ ←Mθ − λ2∑Ki=1Gi ▷ outer update
14: end for
15: returnM
Following popular few-shot-fashion testing procedure [39], the
evaluation restricts that the method needs to be evaluated on all
test tasks. Algorithm 2 shows the testing procedure. The few-shot-
fashion testing procedure should include a fine-tune step by us-
ing few-shot examples, as shown in line 6 of Algorithm 2. In ex-
periments, we adopt a general binary classifier with DNN as the
baseline for comparison. DNN uses a single network for training,
whereas MetaAdvDet uses a double-network framework to obtain
the learning-to-learn strategy. The experiment proves the superior-
ity of our approach in detecting new attacks (Sec. 5.5).
Algorithm 2 MetaAdvDet testing procedure
Input: master networkM and its learned parametersMθ , task-
dedicated network T and its parameters Tθ , the feed-forward
function fTθ of T , fine-tune iterations T , learning rate λ, test
tasks Ti,i ∈{i, · · ·,N } which is obtained by reorganizing the test
set, cross entropy loss L, ground truth Yi,i ∈{i, · · ·,N } of the
query set.
Output: the average F1 score over all tasks
1: for Ti ← T1 to TN do ▷ iterate over all test tasks
2: Si and Qi ← support set and the query set of Ti
3: Tθ ←Mθ ▷ copy parameters to ensure each task is tested
independently
4: for t ← 1 to T do
5: Calculate ∇Tθ L(fTθ ) by using Si
6: Tθ ← Tθ − λ∇Tθ L(fTθ ) ▷ fine-tune step
7: end for
8: Yˆi ← fTθ (Qi ) ▷ get prediction of query set of task i
9: scorei ← F1(Yˆi ,Yi )
10: end for
11: F1 score← 1N
∑N
i=1 scorei
12: return F1 score
The F1 score of the query set is adopted as the metric for evalu-
ating the performance of detection techniques (Sec. 5.2). Note that
the F1 score is calculated upon individual tasks, the final F1 score
is obtained via averaging F1 scores of all tasks, which follows the
few-shot-fashion testing procedure of MiniImagenet [39], steps are
shown in line 11 of Algorithm 2. All the compared methods should
use this metric and include the fine-tune step for fair comparison.
4 PROPOSED BENCHMARK
4.1 Adversarial Example Datasets Construction
In order to validate the effectiveness of our approach, we construct
the adversarial example datasets based on the conventional datasets.
The built datasets use fifteen adversaries to yield examples whose
data sources come from CIFAR-10 [20], MNIST [22] and Fashion-
MNIST [50] datasets, named AdvCIFAR, AdvMNIST and AdvFash-
ionMNIST respectively. To train the detectors for distinguishing
real examples and adversarial examples, each dataset includes an
additional real example’s category whose data are directly trans-
fered from original dataset (i.e. CIFAR-10 etc.). All fifteen types of
adversarial examples are generated by utilizing CleverHans library
[35], which attacks the classifiers with three architectures for each
adversary, namely 4 conv-layers network (conv-4), ResNet-10 [16]
and ResNet-18 [16]. Note that MI-FGSM, BIM and PGD attacks
adopt the ℓ∞ norm version, C&W and Deepfool attacks adopt the
ℓ2 norm version. Such adoptions are based on the attack successful
rate. In addition, the adversarial examples of L-BFGS attack [44]
is used as the validation set. The BPDA attack [2] that utilizes the
obfuscate gradients of defense is not used, because our approach
does not reply on obfuscate gradients. The statistical data for the
adversarial example datasets are shown in Tab. 1.
Table 1: Our adversarial example datasets contain the exam-
ples generated by attacking different architectures, includ-
ing a 4 conv-layers network (conv-4), ResNet-10 and ResNet-
18.This table lists the amount of adversarial exampleswhich
are generated by successfully attacking the conv-4 network.
adversary AdvCIFAR AdvMNIST AdvFashionMNIST
train test train test train test
FGSM [14] 46,851 9260 23,646 3853 48,368 7999
MI-FGSM [9] 46,742 9205 58,445 9701 56,744 9362
BIM [21] 46,076 9118 58,522 9715 56,587 9341
PGD [29] 47,911 9504 58,439 9693 57,060 9428
C&W [4] 47,810 9509 58,121 9651 57,072 9435
jsma [37] 49,141 9807 26,377 4305 39,804 6770
EAD [6] 45,146 8908 59,458 9885 56,157 9283
SPSA [46] 42,183 8436 1260 245 12,604 2225
Spatial Transformation [49] 47,075 9320 58,820 9770 59,520 9917
VAT [32] 28,758 5788 11,392 1869 24,774 4159
semantic [17] 31,704 6415 52,398 8723 47,401 7918
MaxConfidence [13] 48,293 9565 57,676 9604 57,309 9469
Deepfool [33] 44,740 8879 59,461 9886 56,171 9294
NewtonFool [19] 45,240 8916 59,473 9884 56,249 9294
L-BFGS [44](validation set) 9683 9583 9598
4.2 Cross-Adversary Benchmark
To validate the effectiveness of detection techniques in detecting
new attacks, we configure the train set and test set contain no
common type of adversarial examples to simulate this situation. To
this end, the attacks are grouped based on their categories, and we
propose the cross-adversary benchmark which assigns the different
adversary groups to the train set and test set.
Table 2: The definition of adversary groups in the cross-
adversary benchmark.
Train Adversary Group Test Adversary Group Validation Train&Test
FGSM, MI-FGSM, BIM, PGD, C&W,
jsma, SPSA, VAT, MaxConfidence
EAD, semantic, Deepfool, Spa-
tial Transformation, Newtonfool
L-BFGS same domain
Tab. 2 shows the adversary groups of cross-adversary benchmark.
The grouping principles of this benchmark are: (1) each adversary
should be assigned to one group only. (2) The similar adversaries
should be assigned into the same group. For example, the MI-FGSM
adversary is a modification of FGSM, and thus they are similar
and we make them into one group. Based on this benchmark, the
train set and test set should not include attacks of the same group
simultaneously. Note that in this benchmark, the adversaries of
train group extract the train set of the adversarial example dataset
(e.g. train set of FGSM in Tab. 1) to train the detectors. Similarly, the
detectors are evaluated on the test set of the test group’s adversaries.
4.3 Cross-Domain Benchmark
The concept of a domain indicates an adversarial dataset, e.g. Ad-
vMNIST. Since different domains have different data distributions,
Table 3: The cross-domain benchmark consists of 2 proto-
cols on the AdvMNIST and AdvFashionMNIST.
Protocol Train Domain Test Domain Attack Types Test Shots
#1 AdvMNIST AdvFashionMNIST all attacks 1-shot, 5-shot
#2 AdvFashionMNIST AdvMNIST all attacks 1-shot, 5-shot
which leads the cross-domain benchmark to a more challenging
benchmark. To evaluate the capability of detecting the adversarial
examples generated from new domain, the detectors are trained
one domain (Train Domain), and tested on the other domain (Test
Domain). In this benchmark, we focus on the transferability be-
tween two datasets, namely AdvMNIST and AdvFashionMNIST, as
listed in Tab. 3. Note that in this benchmark, all types of the attacks
are used to train the detector.
4.4 Cross-Architecture Benchmark
Table 4: The cross-architecture benchmark consists of 4 pro-
tocols, this benchmark indicates the examples of train set
and test set are generated by attacking different networks.
Protocol Train Arch Test Arch Attack Types Test Shots Train&Test
#1 ResNet-10 ResNet-18 all attacks 1-shot, 5-shot same domain
#2 ResNet-18 ResNet-10 all attacks 1-shot, 5-shot same domain
#3 conv-4 ResNet-10 all attacks 1-shot, 5-shot same domain
#4 ResNet-10 conv-4 all attacks 1-shot, 5-shot same domain
Existing studies show that the adversarial examples generated
by attacking one architecture can fool another architecture [27, 36].
To validate the detection capability in this situation, this bench-
mark stipulates that the train set and test set should include the
adversarial examples come from attacking different architectures.
For example, the detector is trained on the adversarial examples
generated by attacking a classifier with the conv-4 network (Train
Arch), but tested on the ones of ResNet-10 (Test Arch). Tab. 4 shows
the detail of this benchmark, all types of attacks are used to train the
detectors. Three architectures are used, namely conv-4, ResNet-10
and ResNet-18. Note that the concept of architecture in this bench-
mark is only related to the classifier’s backbone during adversarial
examples generation, but not related to the detector model.
4.5 White-box Attack Benchmark
The white-box attack means the adversary has the information of
both the image classifier and is aware of the detector. It has full
knowledge of the detector. In other words, the adversary needs to
fool both the classifier and detector simultaneously, making it more
challenge to defend. We use the targeted iterative FGSM (I-FGSM)
[21] and C&W [4] attacks to simulate white-box attacks with the
method presented in Carlini and Wagner [4]. The basic idea is to
construct a combined model which combines the original classifier
model and the detector. The original classifier has N output labels,
then the newmodel outputs N +1 labels with the last label indicates
whether the input is an adversarial example. More specifically, let’s
denote the new model as B which combines the classifier C and
the detector D. B’s output logits is denoted as ZB , C’s output is
denoted as ZC and D’s output as ZD . The ZB is constructed using
the following formula:
ZB (x )i =
{
ZC (x )i if i ≤ N
ZD (x ) × 2 ×maxZC (x ) if i = N + 1
(1)
It is easy to see that when an input is detected as an adversarial ex-
ample byD, thenZD would be larger than 0.5 and it leadsZB (x )N +1
to be larger than ZB (x)i for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . If an input is detected as a
real example, B classifies it the same label as C does. In this way,
the new model B combines C and D.
Now, we can use the targeted iterative FGSM (I-FGSM) or C&W
adversary to attack this new model B to generate the white-box
adversarial example. The target label is set to make C classify this
example incorrectly but make the example bypass the detector D.
In MetaAdvDet, D represents for the learned master networkM
which would be attacked. Although the white-box attack leads
M to misclassify, MetaAdvDet can benefit from the learning-to-
learn strategy for recovering to the correct prediction with limited
white-box examples provided, as steps shown in Algorithm 2.
5 EXPERIMENT
5.1 Experiment Setting
Table 5: Themodules of one block in the conv-3 backbone of
MetaAdvDet and other comparedmethods. The conv-3 back-
bone consists of 3 such blocks in total, and the last block con-
nects to a fully-connected layer to output a vector with two
probabilities.
index module parameter configuration
1 conv-layer 3×3 kernel, channel = 64, pad = 0
2 batch normalization momentum = 1
3 ReLU -
4 max pooling 2×2 pooling, stride = 2
Table 6: The default parameters configuration which is used
in the ablation study in Sec. 5.4, and also used in other com-
parative experiments of Sec. 5.5, Sec. 5.6, Sec. 5.7 and Sec. 5.8.
name default value description
shots 1 number of examples in a way, MetaAdvDet should
set the same shots in both training and testing.
ways 2 alias of class number, data of the same way come
from using the same adversary to attack the same
category’s images.
train query set size 70 number of examples of a query set in training.
test query set size 30 number of examples of a query set in testing.
task number K 30 number of tasks in each mini-batch.
inner update times 12 iteration times of inner update during training
fine-tune times 20 iteration times of fine-tune during testing.
total tasks 20000 total tasks in the constructed tasks.
inner learning rate 0.001 learning rate of inner update.
outer learning rate 0.0001 learning rate of outer update.
dataset AdvCIFAR the dataset for ablation study
backbone conv-3 the backbone of MetaAdvDet & compared methods
benchmark cross-adversary the benchmark for ablation study
In the construction of tasks, we set the task number to be 20,000
in total, which covers all the samples of the original datasets. During
the learning process, 30 tasks are randomly chosen from these tasks
to form eachmini-batch. In each task, the two-way setting is applied
whichmakesMetaAdvDet to be a binary classifier for distinguishing
the adversarial examples from real examples, as shown in Fig. 2. The
inner-update learning rate λ1 is set to 0.001 empirically. Because
of the summation of gradients in Algorithm 1, the outer-update
learning rate λ2 is set to 0.0001 which is 10 times smaller than λ1.
The training epoch is set to 4, because after 4 epochs, we observe
that the F1 score on the validation set is stable. The query set size
used for outer-update is set to 70 for two ways, that is 35 samples in
each way. The fine-tune iteration times is set to 20 which reaches
the stable performance (Fig. 4b). All parameters configuration is
shown in Tab. 6 which is set empirically based on validation set.
5.2 Evaluation Metric
Our metric restricts that all compared methods need to be evaluated
on 1000 testing tasks to cover all test samples. To quantify the
detection performance of all detection methods, we adopt the F1
score which follows Liang et al.[25] and Sabokrou et al.[40]. It is
defined as the harmonic mean between precision and recall:
recall = TP
TP + FN , precision =
TP
TP + FP
F1 = 2 × precision × recallprecision + recall
(2)
We use label 1 to represent the real example and 0 to represent the
adversarial example, so TP is the number of correctly detected real
examples, FN is the number of real examples that are incorrectly
detected as adversarial examples, and FP is the number of adversar-
ial images that are detected as real examples. Note that the final F1
score is obtained via averaging F1 scores of all tasks (Algorithm 2).
5.3 Compared Methods
The selection of compared state-of-the-art methods are based on
the consideration of two principles: (1) In order to comply with
the few-shot-fashion benchmarks, the compared method must be
an end-to-end learning approach to be fine-tuned in test stage. (2)
The compared methods are able to detect new attacks, in order to
evaluate and compare the detection technique in terms of evolv-
ing adversarial attacks. Based on above principles, MetaAdvDet
is compared with a image rotation transformation based detector,
named TransformDet [45]; and a detection technique based on a
secret fingerprint, named NeuralFP [8]. The NeuralFP is trained
for 100 epochs on each dataset, and TransformDet is trained for 10
epochs on each dataset. In the fine-tune step, because NeuralFP is
trained on real examples, we extract the real examples from sup-
port set to fine-tune. In addition, NeuralFP obtains the F1 score via
determining the best threshold for each task. We configure these
methods following their original settings [8, 45] (Tab. 7).
Table 7: The configuration of train, validation and test set of
all compared methods on the proposed benchmarks.
Method Train Set Test Set Validation Set
DNN train set of adversar-
ial example datasets (e.g.
AdvCIFAR etc.)
constructed tasks
of test set in
adversarial
example datasets,
each task contains
the support set and
the query set. The
performance is
evaluated on the
query set.
constructed tasks
of validation set in
adversarial
example datasets,
each task contains
the support set and
the query set. The
performance is
evaluated on the
query set.
DNN (balanced) train set of adversarial
example datasets which
is down-sampling to
keep class balanced
NeuralFP [8] real examples of train set
in the original dataset
(e.g. CIFAR-10 etc.)
TransformDet [45] train set of adversarial
example datasets, down-
sampling if necessary.
MetaAdvDet constructed tasks of
train set in adversarial
example datasets
We adopt a binary neural network classifier as the baseline,
denotes as DNN. DNN is trained on all data of adversarial example
dataset and its backbone is the same with MetaAdvDet, which is
a 3 conv-layers network (Tab. 5). Because the adversarial example
datasets are the highly class imbalance datasets which containmuch
more adversarial examples than real ones, we train the other DNN
by using the balanced data between adversarial and real samples by
down-sampling, which is denoted as DNN (balanced). The dataset
configurations of different methods are listed in Tab. 7.
5.4 Ablation Study
To inspect the effect of each key parameter respectively, we conduct
the control experiments on AdvCIFAR by adjusting one parameter
while keeping other parameters fixed as listed Tab. 6. Fig. 3 and Fig.
4 are the results of the cross-adversary benchmark.
(a) train query set size study (b) task number K study
Figure 3: Ablation study results of train query set size and
task number of a training mini-batch.
(a) shots study (b) fine-tune iterations study
Figure 4: Ablation study results of shots and fine-tune itera-
tions. MetaAdvDet outperforms the baseline DNN and DNN
(balanced) by a large margin.
From Fig. 4, following conclusions can be drawn:
1) MetaAdvDet outperforms DNN with only a few fine-tuning
iterations, e.g. MetaAdvDet even surpasses the results of all fine-
tune iterations of DNN by only using a single iteration (Fig. 4b).
2) The balanced training data of DNN (balanced) helps to improve
performance over DNN with the few-shot fine-tunings (Fig. 4b).
Table 8: F1 score of randomized-way and fixed-way settings
in AdvCIFAR. The randomized-way indicates that the labels
of two ways are shuffled in each task. The fixed-way uses
label 1 as real example and label 0 as adversarial example.
shots fixed-way randomized-way
1 0.686 0.616
5 0.787 0.772
Tab. 8 illustrates the F1 score results of a randomized-way and
fixed-way assignment settings in AdvCIFAR dataset. It shows that
the result of fixed-way setting outperforms that of randomized-way
setting. In following experiments, we use the fixed-way setting.
5.5 Cross-Adversary Benchmark Result
To compare the performance of our approach and other state-of-the-
art methods under the cross-adversary benchmark. In this section,
we collect the results of TransformDet [45], NeuralFP [8], baseline
DNN and DNN (balanced). Tab. 9 shows that MetaAdvDet outper-
forms the baseline and other methods in nearly all datasets. Thus,
we can conclude MetaAdvDet is able to achieve high performance
in detecting new attack with limited examples of that attack.
Our approach is particularly effective in detecting the attacks
that exhibit quite different appearance from the training attacks.
Typical representative attacks are Spatial Transformation, etc., the
results of three representative attacks are shown in Tab. 10.
Table 9: F1 score of the cross-adversary benchmark, this ta-
ble shows the results in using the adversarial examples gen-
erated by attacking the classifier with conv-4 architecture.
Dataset Method F1 score
1-shot 5-shot
AdvCIFAR
DNN 0.495 0.639
DNN (balanced) 0.536 0.643
NeuralFP [8] 0.698 0.700
TransformDet [45] 0.662 0.697
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.685 0.791
AdvMNIST
DNN 0.812 0.852
DNN (balanced) 0.797 0.808
NeuralFP [8] 0.780 0.906
TransformDet [45] 0.840 0.904
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.987 0.993
AdvFashionMNIST
DNN 0.782 0.885
DNN (balanced) 0.744 0.850
NeuralFP [8] 0.798 0.817
TransformDet [45] 0.712 0.879
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.848 0.944
Table 10: F1 score of representative adversaries on the Adv-
CIFAR dataset, cross-adversary benchmark.
Dataset Adversary Method F1 score
1-shot 5-shot
AdvCIFAR
Spatial Transformation [49]
DNN 0.498 0.599
DNN (balanced) 0.529 0.589
NeuralFP [8] 0.708 0.696
TransformDet [45] 0.633 0.660
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.811 0.920
semantic [17]
DNN 0.488 0.644
DNN (balanced) 0.529 0.657
NeuralFP [8] 0.698 0.700
TransformDet [45] 0.662 0.688
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.763 0.855
NewtonFool [19]
DNN 0.511 0.664
DNN (balanced) 0.542 0.670
NeuralFP [8] 0.696 0.696
TransformDet [45] 0.658 0.716
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.647 0.735
5.6 Cross-Domain Benchmark Result
In the cross-domain benchmark, the models are trained in one
domain, and tested in the other domain’s test set (Sec. 4.3). We use
DNN (balanced) instead of DNN in this benchmark because the
all types of attacks are used to train which results in the highly
imbalanced data classification issue if using DNN. Tab. 11 shows the
result, which demonstrates that MetaAdvDet has an advantage in
hard test set. For example, when training on AdvMNIST and testing
on AdvFashionMNIST, MetaAdvDet outperforms DNN (balanced)
by a large margin (10.1% improvement in 1-shot).
Table 11: F1 score of the cross-domain benchmark, this table
shows the results which are evaluated on the adversarial ex-
amples generated by attacking the conv-4 network. All the
types of attacks are used to train the detectors.
Train Domain Test Domain Method F1 score
1-shot 5-shot
AdvMNIST AdvFashionMNIST
DNN (balanced) 0.698 0.813
NeuralFP [8] 0.748 0.811
TransformDet [45] 0.664 0.808
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.799 0.870
AdvFashionMNIST AdvMNIST
DNN (balanced) 0.950 0.977
NeuralFP [8] 0.775 0.836
TransformDet [45] 0.934 0.940
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.956 0.981
Table 12: F1 score of cross-architecture benchmark.
Dataset Train Arch Test Arch Method F1 score
1-shot 5-shot
AdvCIFAR
ResNet-10 ResNet-18
NeuralFP [8] 0.713 0.709
TransformDet [45] 0.758 0.880
DNN (balanced) 0.702 0.768
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.832 0.902
ResNet-18 ResNet-10
NeuralFP [8] 0.712 0.703
TransformDet [45] 0.788 0.874
DNN (balanced) 0.711 0.752
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.840 0.889
conv-4 ResNet-10
NeuralFP [8] 0.712 0.703
TransformDet [45] 0.763 0.868
DNN (balanced) 0.723 0.779
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.835 0.885
ResNet-10 conv-4
NeuralFP [8] 0.709 0.702
TransformDet [45] 0.766 0.885
DNN (balanced) 0.739 0.790
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.854 0.918
AdvMNIST
ResNet-10 ResNet-18
NeuralFP [8] 0.906 0.882
TransformDet [45] 0.973 0.988
DNN (balanced) 0.943 0.972
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.984 0.993
ResNet-18 ResNet-10
NeuralFP [8] 0.894 0.738
TransformDet [45] 0.967 0.990
DNN (balanced) 0.912 0.953
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.981 0.991
conv-4 ResNet-10
NeuralFP [8] 0.894 0.738
TransformDet [45] 0.972 0.985
DNN (balanced) 0.897 0.959
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.963 0.983
ResNet-10 conv-4
NeuralFP [8] 0.917 0.961
TransformDet [45] 0.984 0.992
DNN (balanced) 0.958 0.978
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.990 0.996
AdvFashionMNIST
ResNet-10 ResNet-18
NeuralFP [8] 0.813 0.856
TransformDet [45] 0.936 0.974
DNN (balanced) 0.848 0.932
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.960 0.979
ResNet-18 ResNet-10
NeuralFP [8] 0.820 0.838
TransformDet [45] 0.935 0.972
DNN (balanced) 0.829 0.918
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.957 0.976
conv-4 ResNet-10
NeuralFP [8] 0.820 0.838
TransformDet [45] 0.946 0.970
DNN (balanced) 0.920 0.968
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.946 0.975
ResNet-10 conv-4
NeuralFP [8] 0.817 0.911
TransformDet [45] 0.945 0.979
DNN (balanced) 0.886 0.945
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.967 0.982
5.7 Cross-Architecture Benchmark Result
Tab. 12 shows the results of cross-architecture benchmark. Because
NeuralFP is trained on the real samples, thus the same NeuralFP
model is tested on the examples of different test architectures (Test
Arch). Tab. 12 shows that MetaAdvDet outperforms other methods
under different train and test architecture combinations, proving
the superiority of MetaAdvDet in the cross-architecture benchmark.
5.8 White-box Attack Benchmark Result
In Tab. 13, we present the detection performance of the white-box
benchmark. The NeuralFP [8] result is omitted because it detects
the attack by setting threshold rather than conducting classification,
which cannot be used in the method of Sec. 4.5. Tab. 13 shows that:
(1) MetaAdvDet can effectively detect white-box attack even with
only one white-box example provided. (2) White-box attack targets
on the master network of the meta-learner in MetaAdvDet, whereas
it targets on the detector itself in other methods.
Table 13: F1 score of white-box attack benchmark.
Dataset Method
I-FGSM Attack C&W Attack
1-shot 5-shot 1-shot 5-shot
CIFAR-10
DNN (balanced) 0.466 0.537 0.459 0.527
TransformDet [45] 0.593 0.728 0.443 0.502
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.553 0.633 0.548 0.607
MNIST
DNN (balanced) 0.857 0.956 0.814 0.913
TransformDet [45] 0.864 0.952 0.775 0.893
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.968 0.994 0.920 0.990
FashionMNIST
DNN (balanced) 0.745 0.890 0.726 0.853
TransformDet [45] 0.837 0.920 0.747 0.853
MetaAdvDet (ours) 0.849 0.963 0.882 0.967
5.9 Inference Time
Table 14: The inference time(ms) of all methods.
Method DNN NeuralFP [8] TransformDet [45] MetaAdvDet (ours)
Inference time (ms) 1.53 ± 0.01 2185.12 ± 18.10 69.17 ± 2.97 4.07 ± 4.40
We further evaluate the inference time (excluding fine-tune steps)
of all the methods measured in millisecond on one NVIDIA Geforce
GTX 1080Ti GPU in Tab. 14. It shows that MetaAdvDet obtains the
comparable inference time toDNN, due to that bothmethods use the
same network architecture and the same feed-forward procedure
for inference. In contrast, TransformDet applies multiple transfor-
mations on the input image which increases the inference time.
NeuralFP tests multiple thresholds to determine the best threshold
for detection, which significantly increases the inference time.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a meta-learning based adversarial attack
detection approach for detecting evolving adversary attacks with
limited examples. To this end, the approach is equipped with a
double-network framework which includes a task-dedicated net-
work and a master network to learn from either individual tasks or
the task distribution. In this way, the rapid adaption capability of
detecting new attacks is achieved. Experimental results conclude
that: (1) Tab. 9, Tab. 11 and Tab. 12 show that NeuralFP gets lower
F1 scores than ours under different benchmarks. It manifests that
NeuralFP which is trained on real examples cannot detect evolv-
ing attacks effectively. (2) We get the lowest results in AdvCIFAR
dataset (Tab. 9, Tab. 12 and Tab. 13), which manifests the adversarial
examples generated in CIFAR-10 are more difficult to detect. (3)
MetaAdvDet performs well in the benchmarks of cross-adversary
(Tab. 9), cross-domain (Tab. 11), cross-architecture (Tab. 12) and
white-box attack (Tab. 13), proving that MetaAdvDet is a suitable
method for detecting evolving attacks with limited examples.
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